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STATUS CHARACTERISTICS AND EXPECTATION STATES:
A PROCESS MODEL
I . Introduction■
In task groups generally it is found that power and prestige are un­
equally distributed; that various components of power and prestige (such as 
participation rates, influence, evaluations of contributions) are highly 
correlated; and that, once having emerged, power-prestige orders are quite 
stable, resisting change (Bales, et al., 1951; Bales, 1953; Bales and Slater, 
1955; Harvey, 1953; Heineclce and Bales, 1953; Sherif, White and Harvey, 1955; 
Short and Strodtbeck, 1963; Strodtbeck, 1951; Strodtbeck, 1954; and Whyte,
1943). In those task groups in which there are prior status differences, 
differences, for example, in age, sex, occupation, or color, it is repeatedly 
found that differences in power and prestige correspond to differences in 
status (Caudill, 1958; Hurwitz, Zander, and Hymovich, 1953; Katz, Goldston, 
and Benjamin, 19 58; Katz and Cohen, 1962; Mishler and Tropp, 19 56; Strodtbeck 
and Mann, 1956; Strodtbeck, James, and Hawkins, 1957; Torrance, 1954: Zander 
and Cohen, 1955; and Ziller and Exline, 1958). Caudill, for example, found 
that in a series of sixty-three consecutive morning rounds in a small psychiatric 
hospital, the head administrator participated more than the chief resident, 
the chief resident more than other residents, the most passive resident more 
than the nursing supervisor, the nursing supervisor more than other nurses, l■
and the ancillary personnel (social workers, occupational therapist) about 
as much as nurses (Caudill, 1958, Chapter 10). If the sixty-three sessions 
are divided into three equal periods, the same order persists stably in each 
period except that the position of the ancillary personnel fluctuates slightly.
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Two facts are particularly interesting about the effects of prior status 
differences. First, whatever they are due to they are not due to direct, 
personal experience of other group members. For the same result is observed 
even if the group members have never previously met. Torrance, for example, 
instructed temporary B-26 crews, composed of a pilot, navigator, and gunner, 
who were not previously acquainted; to estimate the number of dots scattered 
on a card. (The card displayed a very large number of small dots haphazardly 
arranged.) The pilot, who was also air crew commander, had more influence 
on the decision than the navigator, who in turn had more influence than the 
gunner. The same result was obtained for three other tasks (Torrance, 1954). 
Second, prior status differences in the group correspond to the distribution 
of power and prestige even where they do not have any obvious or direct bearing 
on the group task. Often, of course, prior status differences, even in ad hoc 
settings, are of a kind that naturally affect interaction, as when highly 
prestigeful mental health specialists have more influence than less prestigeful 
specialists in a discussion of mental hygiene issues (Hurwitz, Zander, and 
Hymovich, 1953). But the effect is not always of so obvious a kind. One of 
Torrance's four tasks, for example, required his air crews to construct a 
joint story that would describe what was taking place in an ambiguous picture 
taken from a projective test. It is not self-evident that the pilot should 
have, either as a consequence of his training or of his predictable task- 
abilities, any projective story-telling skills; but even for this task the 
pilot influenced the final story more than the navigator, the navigator in­
fluenced it more than the gunner (Torrance, 1954). Thus it has been repea­
tedly found that
When task groups are differentiated with respect to some status 
characteristic external to the task situation, this differentiation 
determines the observed power and prestige order within the group, 
whether or not the members have previously known each other or the 
external characteristic is related to the group task.
In a previous paper (Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch, 1965) we have explained
this result in the following way: (1) In a task situation, the observed
distribution of power and prestige, for example the distribution of performance
cutputs, or of evaluations of task-contributions, can be regarded as a function
of underlying beliefs about relative abilities to perform the task (Berger
jm
and Snell, 1961); if, for example, an actor, p, believes another actor, o, 
is better at the task than he himself is, and if he is committed to his group's 
success at the task, then he will defer to o's suggestions. (2) While such 
expectations can arise from direct experience of others, they can also be em­
bodied in stereotyped beliefs about people who have particular states of a 
status-characteristic; if, for example, p is male and o is female, p may 
assume, even without knowing o personally, that he is better than o at what­
ever task they are to perform. (3) In situations in which p and o are to 
work together to accomplish a collective task, and in which they care about 
the successful outcome of the task, there will be some pressure on the actors 
to assign expectation states to each other; for example, p will want to know 
how seriously to take suggestions made by o. (4) If p and o differ in status, 
and there is no other basis for assigning expectations about performance ex­
cept this difference, then beliefs embodied in the status-characteristic be­
come a basis for assigning expectations. (5) Even if the task requires an 
ability that is not part of the stereotyped conceptions that p and o have of
each other, the status-characteristic will become significant in the situation 
because it has a halo effect; it tends to become diffuse, to generalize. (6)
In either case, therefore, whether the task requires a wholly new ability or 
not, because the status-characteristic determines assignment of expectations, 
and expectations determine the observed distribution of power and prestige, 
we wiril find that the power-prestige order corresponds to the prior status 
differences.
This formulation is sufficient to account for results like those of 
Strodtbeck and Torrance, but it is applicable essentially to non-process 
experiments. In the present paper we propose to extend it, so that we are 
able to describe an action process through which, step-by-step, the status- 
characteristic determines the allocation of performance expectations. This 
extension is significant, first in that it provides a way of precisely testing 
some of the basic assertions in our formulation, second in that it is a model 
applicable in an important class of interactive settings. But it should be 
understood that the model is in no sense exhaustive, there are other interactive 
settings in which the effects of prior status differences are apparent, in 
which prior status differences in fact function in the way we have just 
claimed that they do, but in which the action process itself is different.
In Section II we summarize our previous formulation: there we define 
a diffuse status-characteristic, show how it comes to determine performance 
expectations in specific task situations, and, finally, show how performance 
expectations determine the observed distribution of power and prestige. In 
Section III the way in which we propose to extend this formulation is described.
In Section IV we formalize the model developed in Section III. This is 
followed by a technical appendix, in which questions of estimating and 
testing the model are considered.
II. Basic Concepts'־'and As-sumptions.
The idea of a diffuse status-characteristic has already been developed 
in Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch, 1965 and Zelditch, Cohen, and Berger, 1965.
Here we only summarize the main features of the definition and emphasize 
those aspects of it that are particularly relevant to this paper.
It will be recalled that, first, characteristics like age, sex, ethnicity, 
or color, are symbolically rather than intrinsically significant. 1׳Black" 
in itself means nothing; what is important about color is what it stands for 
in the minds of many people. Second, associated with status-characteristics 
are sets of fairly specific beliefs, such as 1’Negroes are musical." But third, 
such specific beliefs tend also to generalize to the actor as a whole, rather 
like a halo effect, so that one is able not only mathematically, or mechanically, 
or verbally; one is also simply "able" in a way that is quite general and in­
definite. Fourth, states of a status-characteristic stand for evaluations 
of people as well as beliefs about them; these evaluations are also given to 
the specific and general beliefs associated with the characteristic.
We employ the following notation: D is used to refer to status-characterist
D to refer to its states. In this paper we talk of characteristics as x
having two states, so that x = a or b. For example: though occupation is 
a characteristic having many states, we arbitrarily lump some of these so that
we might have, say, white-collar and blue-collar occupations. C is used to 
refer to specific characteristics (such as mathematical, or mechanical ability) 
C to its states (x = a, b). States are differentially evaluated if one 
is positively and one negatively evaluated; for, limiting ourselves to two 
states, we have only two values as well. A set of states of specific charac­
teristics is represented by ^ ^  (where again x = a, b). The generalized state 
that, like a halo effect, also comes to be associated with states of D, is 
represented by GES^ (for general expectation state). We mean by a diffuse 
status-characteristic, then,
Definition 2.1. A characteristic D is a diffuse status-characteristic if
and only if
(1) the states of D are differentially evaluated, and
(2) to each state, x, of D there corresponds a distinct 
set ^  of specifically associated evaluated states 
of characteristics, and
(3) to each state, x, of D there corresponds a distinct
general expectation state, GES , having the same
evaluation as the state D .x
In this definition the term ,,specifically associated” refers to those 
states that are understood as a matter of socially accepted belief to be re­
lated to states of D. If C is specifically associated with D , then anX X
actor p will attribute to another, say o, if told that o possesses state 
D^. For example, p may expect himself to be better at solving mathematical 
puzzles than o if p is male and o is female; in that case, in p's eyes ma­
thematical ability is associated with sex.
Note that a state and its value are carefully distinguished, since it
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is possible to negatively evaluate the higher state of a characteristic.
For example, high aggressiveness is sometimes negatively evaluated. And, 
of course, the high and low states of a specific characteristic may not be 
differentially evaluated at all. High ability to solve mathematical puzzles 
may be positively evaluated by some, not evaluated at all by others; not 
that it would be negatively evaluated, but rather it would have no evaluative 
significance.
Whether, for a particular actor in a particular situation, a given charac­
teristic is a diffuse status ־•characteristic or not, is of course an empirical 
question. In each case in which our theory is to be applied we must first 
ask: does p differentially evaluate the states of D? Does he have specific 
beliefs about those who possess different states of D? Does he believe those 
who possess one state of D to be superior to those who have the other, simply
because they possess state D ? Social class, for example, is a diffusex
status-characteristic in a community if the white-collar class is thought, 
ipso facto, to be more worthy, smarter, more moral, more industrious, more 
energetic, and in fact altogether superior in almost every way that counts 
in the community, to the blue-collar class.
If a diffuse status-characteristic embodies beliefs about actors that, 
in the absence of direct experience or personal knowledge of a particular 
actor, can stand in place of such experience, we naturally will want to ask 
in what situations such beliefs come to determine interaction. Four con­
ditions appear to be important.^ Hereafter we will take these four conditions 
as defining what we mean when we use the expression ,’the situation S.״
^The conditions we describe here are sufficient, but they do not 
necessarily exhaust the possible situations in which D becomes significant.
First, we will assume that there is a collective, valued task, T; that 
is, a task that requires p and o to act together in order to achieve some
task-outcome, say T , that is more positively evaluated than some other8
outcome, T. . P is therefore committed to "success" at the task and must b
take the behavior of o into account in achieving that success.
Second, we may think of the task as requiring an ability C, with states
C and C, . We will say that C is instrumental to T, if one state of C increa-a b ------------
ses the likelihood that p achieves one of the outcome states of T while the 
second state of C increases the likelihood that p achieves the second outcome 
state of T. If not instrumental, C is independent of T. We assume that if
C is instrumental to T , and T is the positively valued outcome of T, thena a a
C is the positively evaluated state of C, while C, is negatively evaluated.
cl D
Third, we assume that p has not assigned specific states of C to him­
self or 0, nor has such an assignment been provided as an initial condition 
of situation S.
Fourth, we assume that p and o possess different states of a single 
status-characteristic D, so that D is a basis of discrimination between p 
and o in situation S.
In such a situation, we will say that the diffuse status-characteristic 
is activated if and only if the specifically associated sets of states 
and the general expectation state GES^, that are associated in the actors' 
minds with D^, are attributed by p to the actors in the situation. This 
is meant to formulate as exactly as we can the idea that the characteristic 
and the beliefs associated with the characteristic become significant to the 
actors and become part of a meaningful response that the actors have to each 
other. What we have, of course, is a situation in which there is some pres­
sure to assign states of C to actors, that is to attribute expectation states
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to them, but no basis for doing so. Since beliefs about states of D are 
capable of being viewed as "experience5' which embodies knowledge about how actor: 
will behave, D becomes a basis from which expectations can be inferred.
Assumption 2.1. (Activation). D is activated in task situation S if 
T is a differentially evaluated, dollective task, and 
D is a basis of discrimination between p and o in S.
If D is activated in the situation S, and C is the characteristic in­
strumental to T in that situation, then either C has already been specifically 
associated with D or it has not. If it has, then assignment of states of C 
is immediate, since activation means that the characteristics allocated to 
D are attributed to actors. For example: Hurwitz, Zander, and Hymovich (1953), 
require mental health specialists to discuss a mental health problem. Some 
are "eminent specialists” in the field, while others are not. We can in this 
setting assume that the specific characteristic is already associated with 
states of the diffuse characteristic.
If it has not been specifically associated with states of D, C might be 
very similar to a characteristic that has. Or it might even be well-known 
to be irrelevant to D; that is, the social definition that forms part of p's 
beliefs about D might explicitly regard C as independent of, or dissociated 
from, D. But here we are particularly interested in the situation in which 
there has been no prior relation specified at all. A close parallel is 
Torrance's projective story task, in which officers and enlisted men combine 
to tell a story based on an ambiguous stimulus. In this case, even though 
C has not previously been associated with states of D, we shall believe that
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the burden of proof will be on anyone to show that D is not relevant to C.
Relevance here means that possession of the state of one characteristic is
a basis for anticipating possession of a state of a second characteristic.
Actors will want to know who is good and who poor at the task; if there are
general expectation states associated with D, they will become relevant to C.
Assumption 2.2. (Burden of Proof). If C has not been previously associated 
with or dissociated from D, and D is activated in S, and D 
is the only basis for discriminating p and o, then D will 
become relevant to C in S.
It is, of course, natural to suppose that states of C when they are 
assigned, will be assigned to p and o so as to accord with their states of 
D and GES. We will call such an assignment balanced.
Definition 2.2. (Balance). Two relevant or associated states are balanced 
in S, if and only if they have the same evaluation.
And,
Definition 2.3. (Balance). A status structure is balanced in S, if and
only if all its relevant or associated states are balanced.
For example, if p is a college senior and o is a high school freshman,
then to attribute a positively evaluated ability to p and a negatively evaluated
ability to o will be balanced. To attribute a negatively evaluated ability
to p and a positively evaluated ability to o would be imbalanced.
Assumption 2.3. (Assignment). If p and o possess differentially evaluated 
states of D, and D is relevant to C in S , p will assign 
in S states of C to himself and o that are balanced with 
the states of D that he and o possess.
We have, now, a set of assumptions that will explain how states of C 
are attributed to p and o in the absence of any information in the experimental
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situation itself that would be grounds for assigning expectations. Either D 
is already associated with C and conveys some information to p and o about 
who should do well and who poorly; or D is not already associated with C but 
the general expectation state associated with D is seen as relevant in the 
situation and conveys similar information. How will this affect the inter­
action that takes place?
Consider first a situation in which there is no D to distinguish actors 
at all, but we have a valued, collective task--say the Bales' conference 
setting (1953). We may think of each actor as having certain opportunities 
to act, as when p is asked by o what he thinks about a given problem; if, 
given this opportunity, p seizes the chance to act, we may say that he makes 
a problem-solving attempt; if, on the other hand, p does not take the oppor­
tunity offered, but instead allows o an action-opportunity, then we may find 
that p praises, agrees with, or shows some kind of reaction to o 1s behavior, 
which we will call a unit evaluation ("unit", to distinguish evaluation of a 
particular act from the more general evaluations of states of characteristics); 
if p does make a problem-solving attempt, and then tries to have o change 
his own views in the direction of p's suggestions, we can speak of an in­
fluence attempt, and if p succeeds we can speak of the exercise of influence.
If we choose these as the selected features of interactive febat^ .are of .most t
interest from the point of view of the present theory, the whole set of actions
2taken together can be called an observable power-prestige order.
2A standardized experimental situation has been developed in which these 
concepts are operationalized. The situation is structured so that, for ex­
ample, action opportunities, agreements and disagreements on unit acts, and
It will be recalled that certain uniformities in the distribution of 
power and prestige are regularly observed: first, they are almost always un­
equally distributed; second, each component is highly correlated with the 
other; third, differences in power-prestige are correlated with influece over 
the final decision (Bales ej: ¿1., 1951; Bales, 1953; Strodtbeck, 1951; Strodt- 
beck, 1954). A parsimonious way of accounting for these facts is to regard 
the observable power-prestige order as a function of a hypothetical, underlying 
performance-expectation structure (Berger and Snell, 1961). If C is instrumen­
tal to task T, the expectations associated with the states C can be ordered 
as "high” and "low", where the high state is that !which increases the likeli­
hood that p achieves the positively evaluated outcome and the low state is 
that which increases the likelihood that p achieves the negatively evaluated 
outcome of T. And we have,
Assumption 2.4. (Basic Expectation Assumption). If C is instrumental to T 
and if specific performance expectations for C are attribu­
ted by p to himself and o in S , the observable power-prestige 
order in S will tend to be an increasing function of these 
attributed states.
By the expression in Assumption 2.4, "will tend to be an increasing 
function of these attributed states," we mean that the rates of received 
action-opportunities, performance-outputs initiated, positive unit evaluations 
received, and successful influence attempts, will tend to be greater for the
communicated unit evaluations can be controlled, and successful influence 
studied as dependent behavior. Thus, in general the different types of be­
havior associated with the power and prestige order of the task-oriented 
group can be studied while the remaining behavior types are experimentally 
controlled. This situation is related to the process model discussed in 
Section III and IV and will be referred to as the expectation action 
situation.
actor to’whüm the high state of C-iB attributed than the actor to whom the
low state of C is attributed.
Note that, because they are all functions of the same underlying factor, 
all of the observable components of the power-prestige order will be correlated. 
That they will be differentiated, however, is a consequence of additional 
assumptions into which we need not venture far here, since they are for the 
moment outside the scope of our defined objectives. (See, however, Berger 
and Snell, 1961, and Section III of this paper.)
We have now the following explanation of the Strodtbeck־־Torrance type 
of experiment: There are two possible situations, in one of which C has al­
ready been specifically associated with states of D, in the other of which 
it bears no prior relation to D.
In the first case, C is instrumental to the collective task, T, and one 
outcome of T is more valued than another. The experimental conditions are 
such as to activate D, and external diffuse status-characteristic, since actors 
have no previous personal knowledge of each other and there is no basis for 
discriminating one from another in the immediate task situation except D.
By activating D, since C is already associated with it, actors are able to 
attribute performance-expectation states to themselves and others. The ob­
served power-prestige order will be a function of the states they assign.
If we assume that the high state of the performance characteristic is the 
positively evaluated state, and is the state associated with the positively 
evaluated state of D, conditions that appear usually to be satisfied, we will 
find that the distribution of observed power and prestige will tend to coincide
with the distribution־ of the׳'diffuse status-characteristic.
An example of the first kind of situation we want to distinguish is re­
ported by Zander and Cohen (1955), who formed '1committees" of college students 
who were to discuss how to dispose of a gift to their school made by an anonymou 
donor. Into each committee Zander and Cohen introduced two students, one 
identified as a Dean and one as a freshman, though the two did not themselves 
know how they had been identified to the other students. Interviewed after 
brief discussions with their committees, Deans, more than the freshmen, re״ 
ported that other students were attentive to and readily agreed with their 
ideas.
In the second case, in which no prior relation has been specified between 
D and C, we have as in the first case that C is instrumental to the collective 
task T, T is valued, but actors have no idea what state of C to attribute 
either to p or to o . D is activated because there is no basis other than 
the diffuse status-characteristic, either in the situation or from past 
knowledge of each other, to discriminate the "able" from the ״unable‘1 actors. 
Even though there is no reason to suppose that D is relevant to C, since they 
have not previously been socially defined in relation to each other, we be­
lieve the burden of proof is on the actors to show that D is not relevant 
(Assumption 2.2). This simply expresses the generalising power of the GES 
states. If relevant, D becomes a basis for attributing states of C to actors. 
States of C will be assigned in such a way that they accord with, or are balance 
with, states of D. Having attributed states of C to actors, the performance״ 
expectations they hold for each other will determine the distribution of obser­
vable power and prestige. If the high state of C is the positively evaluated
state, then the distribution of power and prestige that is observed will tend 
to coincide with the distribution of the diffuse status-characteristic.
The clearest example of the second kind of situation is Torrance's pro­
jective discussion task (Torrance, 1954). It will be recalled that, among 
Torrance's four tasks,one called for air crews to construct a joint story 
about an ambiguous picture taken from a projective test. In both temporary 
and permanent air crews, the pilot had the greatest influence, the navigator 
was next, and the gunner had the least influence over the crew story. We 
argue that this result cannot be explained by supposing that 1’projective story 
telling" skills are associated, in the minds of the subjects, with air crew 
position or air force rank. The idea of a general expectation state and the 
burden of proof assumption alone can account for it.
This completes our first task, which was to construct a theory relating 
diffuse status characteristics to an observed power and prestige order and 
as a consequence to explain the results obtained by Strodtbeck, Torrance, and 
others. The theory that we have constructed is deliberately formulated so 
as to exist independent of any particular process of attribution of per­
formance expectations. That is, the theory presumes that attribution must 
always occur in an action setting of one kind or another but it does not 
specify that action setting. Hence, we envisage the possible investigation 
of a wide variety of settings and consequently possible construction of 
many process models. However, we have as our present objective the consi״ 
deration in some detail of only one particular kind of action setting and we 
intend as our second main task to specify precisely in that setting one
process by which status characteristics determine performance expectations. 
This task we undertake in Section III.
III. Assignment of specific performance expectations.
In this section we shall construct a set of assumptions describing 
one action process through which specific performance expectations come 
to be attributed to actors. Definitions and assumptions from Section II 
will provide the initial status conditions of the situation. Given this 
initial status situation, we shall describe a specific task and inter­
action situation, in which the process of assignment takes place. Given 
these three sets of conditions, respecting status, task, and interaction, 
we will be able to describe exactly a sequence of actions that takes 
place in the defined situation, and show how, as a consequence of these 
actions a given actor, p, assigns the states of C to himself and others.
We shall also show how, after the assignment of states to actors, the 
assignment of states itself can be seen as determining the further course 
of the action process.
A. Initial status situation
The first set of conditions that we must specify have to do with 
the status situation in which actors find themselves at the outset of 
the process. We will talk of only two actors, p and o. The situation 
is viewed from p's point of view, and there are two objects of his orien­
tation in the situation: himself, p', and the other, o. We assume that 
the following conditions are given: (1) there is a valued collective
task, T, one state of which is positively evaluated by p and o, so that 
to achieve that state represents '1success”, while the other state is 
negatively evaluated, representing "failure"; (2) there is a specific 
performance characteristic, C, instrumental to T; (3) the states of C 
have not been previously attributed to p ׳ and o, nor previously associated 
with states of status characteristic D$ and (4) there is a diffuse status 
characteristic, D, with respect to which p and o are differentiated.
If these conditions are given, assumption 2.1 leads us to conclude 
that D will be activated, so that p will attribute to p1 and o the GES 
associated with their states of D. Either p believes that he himself is 
generally superior and o generally inferior, or the reverse. And, although 
p will not know which state of C either he or o possesses, assumption 2.2 
leads us to conclude that D will be relevant to C~־that is, p will believe 
that possessing a given GES is not independent of possessing a given state 
of C.
We may conveniently represent this situation in the following way. 
Allow the sign "+" to represent any positive or high expectation (general 
or specific) and any negative or low expectation; and allow 0 to repre­
sent an unformed expectation. Let any expectation state with respect to 
a given characteristic be represented by an ordered pair with expectations 
for self in first position and expectations for other in second position. 
Thus [+~] means that p has high expectations for self, low for other, with 
respect to some specified characteristic. In order to distinguish general 
from specific expectations, enclose the former in braces '• and the
latter in [ ] brackets. Now: there are only two possible states in which
the process, from p's point of view, can start; for either p is superior
and o inferior, or the reverse; and expectations about C are not yet formed,
even though general expectations are relevant. The process must therefore
r r ibegin either in the state ^ +00] <־] or *; [-־00] ־+ where general expectation 
states are written first, and the specific performance characteristic is 
that characteristic to which GES is relevant.
B. Task and interaction conditions
We will assume that in this initial status situation p is confronted 
with an an n-step decision process, which in an experiment can be iden­
tified with n identical trials. At each decision step p and o must each 
make a binary choice, say between the two alternatives A and B. The 
decision, however, is a multi-stage decision: for, after making a preli­
minary selection of one of the two alternatives, actors are required to 
exchange information about their choices and then to come to a final 
decision. We envision a situation in which the process of exchanging 
information about preliminary decisions is controlled by the experimenter, 
so that, for example, we can manipulate subjects' beliefs that they agree 
or disagree in their preliminary decision. Throughout we will restrict 
ourselves to the special case in which p' and o are in continual disagreement. 
At each decision step, finally, p is led to believe that there is one 
"correct" and one "incorrect” alternative, but he is not provided with an 
objective standard by which he can determine which alternative is correct.
P is assumed to believe (and in an experiment would have to be made to believe 
by the experimenter's instructions) that only his final decision counts.
־18־
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Fur ther, the question of where his final decision comes from has been defined 
to him as being of minimal or no importance. In other words, p is primarily 
motivated to take that alternative which he thinks is correct, whether it is
3his own preliminary decision or the preliminary decision of o.
Now, given this sort of task, these interaction conditions, and the 
initial status situation, our problem is to describe a process by which the 
states of the specific performance characteristic C, and thus specific 
self״other performance expectations, come to be attributed by p to him­
self and o. The process will have two general features: (1) it will 
relate the actions of p at each decision step to his assignment of specific 
expectations to self and other, and (2) it will, conversely, relate attributed 
self-other expectations to the actions of p at each decision step. We 
also divide the task of constructing this process in two parts: for, 
first, we want to construct a set of action possibilities, which permit 
us to specify exactly every possible path from the starting to the terminal 
state of each decision step; second, we will want to assign probabilities 
to each event, hence each path, in this set of action possibilities.
For the sake of clarity of exposition and ease of expression we separate 
the discussion of these two parts, undertaking to define action possibilities 
in the next sections, Sections C and D, and assigning probabilities in 
Section E.
_
We distinguish a person-oriented situation, in which p wants to do well 
himself, from a task-oriented situation, in which p wants the best answer 
to a problem, regardless of source. Here we assume p is task-oriented.
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C. Action possibilities
We have a situation in which p begins in one of two states, [00]
or i,—i00] "־] , depending upon his state of the characteristic D. The 
task and interaction conditions are so structured that on each step of the 
process, p must make a preliminary decision in which he is required to choose 
which of two alternatives (say A or B) is more likely to be the correct one. 
In the case that p has initially evaluated the alternatives, his choice, is 
determined by those evaluations and we have,
Assumption 3.1. At any stage of the process: if p positively evaluates 
one alternative and negatively evaluates the second, 
then p will select the first and reject the second.
But p must make a choice even if he has not initially evaluated the 
alternatives. If p has not initially evaluated alternatives, but is never­
theless required to make a choice, we assume that he will still come to 
evaluate positively the alternative he selects and evaluate negatively 
the alternative he rejects. We reason that the experimenter has defined 
the situation in such a way that p believes there ijs a correct answer. It 
is p’s task to be correct. And when he selects an alternative, that alter­
native will be viewed by o and by the experimenter as the alternative p 
believes to be correct. Therefore, p will come to feel that he is respon­
sible for making correct decisions, and will want to see the alternative he 
has chosen as in fact the correct one. Hence, if p has not evaluated 
alternatives before making his choice,
Assumption 3.2. At any stage of the process: if p required to accept 
one alternative as correct and reject the second as 
incorrect, then p will differentially evaluate alter­
natives .
The principal significance of 3.2. is that p is assumed to believe 
(and must be made by experimental instructions to actually believe) that 
he has discovered some plausible basis for choosing one alternative rather 
than another. He is not, for example, convinced that his choice is a 
',guess", that if he obtained the correct answer it was purely a matter of 
chance. In both cases we shall call the structure of the situation at 
this initial stage p's preliminary choice structure. A digraph representing 




Figure 1. P has positively evaluated and selected alternative A 
and negatively evaluated and rejected alternative B. 
Directed lines indicate evaluations, which can be posi­
tive (+) or negative (-). Directed braces indicate in 
this case, selection (+) or rejection (-). (In this and 
in all subsequent digraphs the labelling of A and B is 
arbitrary.)
Once the preliminary choice structure has been completed and p's 
decision made, p exchanges information with o and discovers, under the 
vonditions we are imagining, that o's preliminary decision disagrees
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with that of p. We shall call the situation where p and o have selected 
different alternatives an act of disagreement and we reason that it can 
only imply for p that he and o have assigned different evaluations to 
the alternatives, and, therefore, that he and o had different prelimi 
nary choice structures.
Assumption 3.3. At any stage of the process: P associates an act of 
disagreement between self and other with differences 
in evaluations of alternatives by self and other.
Again the point that is important is that p does not just assume o 
was guessing when he made his choice. Just as p himself is assumed to 
positively evaluate the alternative he has selected and to negatively 
evaluate the alternative he has rejected, so too we expect p to believe 
that o was not guessing, that o in fact also positively evaluated the 
alternative he selected and negatively evaluated the alternative he 
rejected. Confronted with disagreement, therefore, p believes that o 
has also evaluated the alternatives, but differently.
P's conception of the situation at this new stage of the decision 
step is represented by the digraphs in Figure 2. Note that now we have 
a self-other choice structure, a graph that contains both p's choices 




Figure 2b. P associates an act 
of disagreement with different 
evaluations of alternatives by 
himself and other. Evaluations 
from o to A and B represent in­
ferences p makes on the basis of 
the observable choice structure 
shown in 2a.
Figure 2a. P is given the information 
that o disagrees. The letter p' stands 
for p as an object of orientation to 
himself. (Note: Relations originating 
from p' represent p's perceptions of 
his own preliminary decision, which are 
now objects of orientation to p just as 
o's preliminary decision is.) P views 
himself, as well as o, as having selec­
ted and rejected certain alternatives.
Now p is forced to make a final decision. We conceive that there 
are probably two activities going on simultaneously, or possibly atlernating 
with each other, at this stage. P probably is trying to decide which 
alternative is right and which wrong, A or B, and also who is right and 
who is wrong, p' or o. P might either decide about persons first, or 
about alternatives first; but he must in some way make a choice. At 
this stage of the process, of course, p's expectations about the specific 
performance characteristic do not provide any basis for choice. In fact, 
we will want to see how, as a consequence of making a final decision there 
is some impetus to assign states of C to p' and o.
If p is not able to decide who is right, he is still required to 
choose between the alternatives. Applying assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 to 
.us stage we reason that p will come to differentially evaluate A and
B, and will select and reject them in accord with his evaluations. There 
are two possibilities. Either p continues to view his preliminary choice 
as correct, or p changes his evaluations of the alternatives and makes 
a selection that accords with o's preliminary decision. We will call 
these final decisions the observed response process and define:
Definition 3.1. P makes a P-response at any stage of the process if
his final selection of an alternative is the same as his 
preliminary selection. P makes an O-response at any 
stage of the process if his final selection of an alter­
native is the same as o 1s preliminary selection.
Whichever alternative p finally chooses, we reason that the outcome 
of his choice is to assign unit evaluations to the persons, p' and o. (A 
unit evaluation is an evaluation of p' or o's performance on a given step 
of the process,) Further, his assignment of unit evaluations will coincide 
with the evaluations p has made of the alternatives. Thus, for example, if 
he makes a P-response then he will come to believe that "I was right and o 
was wrong'*. If he makes an O־response he will come to believe that ,:I was 
wrong and o was right".
In terms of the digraphs of p's self-other choice structure, this 
is equivalent to assuming that p will complete his self-other choice 
structure so that the digraph is balanced in the meaning of the term 
given by Cartwright and Harary (1956).
If p is able to decide who. is right then we argue that p will evaluate 
the alternatives in accord with this decision and, applying assumption 3.1,
־.hat p will make a P or an 0 response which is consistent with these evaluations.
Thus, whether p first evaluates alternatives or first evaluates persons 
he will complete his choice structure in a balanced manner. Both possi­
bilities are taken into account in the following assumption.
Assumption 3.4. At any stage of the process: If p assigns positive and 
negative evaluations to alternatives or to persons, he 
will complete his self-other choice structure in a 
balanced manner.
Two possible ways of arriving at a final complete and balanced struc­
ture are shown in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 is an example of the first proces 
described in assumption 3.4, in which alternatives are evaluated, then persons 
figure 4 is an example of the second process covered by assumption 3.4, in 
which persons are evaluated, then alternatives. [Note: Relations originating 
from p (rather than p'), in the center of the figure, represent p's actions
in making his final decision.]
7>>
Figure 3b. P completes the 
self-other choice structure 
in a balanced manner by evaluating 
p' positively and o negatively.
Figure 3a. P makes a P-response, 
again selecting (and positively 
evaluating) alternative A and rejecting 
(and negatively evaluating) alterna״
;ve B. Final choices are shown on 
e central vertical axis of the digraph.
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Figure 4b. P completes the self- 
other choice structure in a balan­
ced manner by selecting and posi­
tively evaluating o's preliminary 
choice and by rejecting and nega­
tively evaluating his own preli­
minary choice.
Figure 4a. P decides that he is 
incorrect and o is correct, thus 
assigning positive and negative 
unit evaluations to p' and o.
Now consider the effects of this completed choice structure on p's 
assignment of states of C to self and other. The assignment of unit 
evaluations to p' and o, as an outcome of the resolution of dis­
agreement, has two important consequences. First, p may be led to believe 
that he and o possess different states of C. Second, p may be led to 
believe that he and o possess particular states of C, specifically those 
that are balanced with the unit evaluations p has made. For example, from 
the fact that, "I was right and he was wrong in this instance," p may be 
led to believe, "We differ in this ability, and I am better at this task 
than he is." Thus, as a result of differential unit evaluations the 
possibility now exists that p will assign differentially evaluated states of 
1 to self and other, states of C that are in balance with p's unit evaluations,
But the assignment of states of C depends also on the diffuse status 
characteristic D. For, from assumption 2.3 (page 10) we are led to expect 
that assignment of states of C will occur only if they are balanced with 
general expectation states attributed to p' and o on the basis of their 
respective states of D. If p is in the expectations state *. + 0 0 ]  . ־] , he 
may entertain the possibility that ”1 am better on this ability than he is," 
if in a particular instance he has concluded, "I was right and he was wrong."
But if in a particular instance he has concluded "I was wrong and he was right," 
a possibility not precluded by our theory, we do not believe he will entertain 
the idea that '1He is better at this task than I am." In our view, the 
resolution of disagreements on a given step in the process will lead to an 
assignment of specific performance expectations only if such an assignment will 
simultaneously balance unit evaluations and general expectation states.
Hence
Assumption 3.5. At any stage of the process: If p assigns unit evalu­
ations to persons, then the possibility exists that p 
will also assign those states of C which balance with 
his assignment of unit evaluations if and only if such 
assignment is in balance with his assigned general 
expectation states.
Let us consider the import of these assumptions for some specific 
cases. Consider a p in a ^+־f [00] expectation state who makes a P-response 
on a given trial. By assumption 3.4, and the definition of P-response, he
It is not intended at present that this assumption apply necessarily to 
cases other than where p and o possess different states of D and where D is 
ctivated. The process might operate quite differently in situations where,
_r example, p and o both possess the high state of the characteristic D.
will assign a positive unit evaluation to self and a negative unit evaluation 
to other. By assumption 3.5, there now exists a possibility that p will 
assign the positively evaluated state of C to self and the negatively evaluated 
state of C to other, since an assignment is consistent with*־both his unit
evaluations and his assignment of general expectation states to self and
r y C }other. Thus p may change his expectation state from : +- > [00] to v+-< ]־•־ ׳ “]•
' j  ^ -־
By a similar line of reasoning, the possibility exists for a p who starts
out in a ) -+r [00] expectation state, and makes an 0״response to change his
C 7expectation; to j -+ . [־־I־}.* J
Consider, on the other hand, a p who initially is in a < 0 0 ]  )׳+־] state 
and makes an 0־response. By assumption 3.4 and definition of an 0~response, 
he will assign a negative unit evaluation to self and a positive unit evalu­
ation to other. But any assignment of states of C which balance with p's 
unit evaluations will be imbalanced with the GES's that have been attributed 
to p' and o. Hence, by assumption 3.5, such an assignment of states of 
C cannot take place. Although we assume that p in this situation may be 
under some pressure or tension, we expect him to remain in a ! 00] ־+־־] 
state as a result of this sequence of events. By a parallel line of 
reasoning, we expect a p who is initially in a j -+ \ [00] state and makes 
a P־response to continue in a «, 00] \+־] state.
Now suppose that, as a result of events at earlier stages of the 
process, p has in fact assigned states of C to self and other. What can 
we say about his behavior at later stages of the process? For example,
•׳־isider a p who, on a given step of the decision-making process is in a
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1 +־ s [+-■] expectation state, faces a disagreement with o, and makes a
V.
P-response. By assumption 3.4 p assigns positive unit evaluations to self 
and negative to other. Such an assignment is consistent with his assign­
ment of states of C. We expect, therefore that his specific performance 
expectations will continue unchanged to the next step of the process. By 
a similar line of reasoning we argue that a p who on some step of the process
/ * 7 ־ ״׳״־
is already in a ־+ r [־+] expectation state, who faces a disagreement, and 
who then makes an 0-response, maintains his expectation state into the next 
step of the process.
On the other hand, consider the case of a p who on some step of the
•* 7process is in a / + ]+־־ ״! ] state, who faces a disagreement and who then makes 
an O-response. By assumptions 3.3 and 3.4, and the definition of O-response, 
he assigns a negative unit evaluation to self and a positive unit evaluation 
to other on this step. This creates an imbalance, and the question arises 
whether this will affect his assignment of states of C. But if p were to 
change his assignment of states of C, in order to bring about balance with 
unit evaluations, he can only create, as a consequence, imbalance with his 
assignment of general expectation states. By assumption 3.5 this reassignment 
of states could not occur. Therefore we do not expect a p who has moved 
to a ]+־ \ +~ ־ ] state and then made an O-response to change his expectation 
state. Similarly we do not expect a p who has moved to a [־+] state
who makes a P-response to change his expectations. Thus, one of the very
important consequences of our assumptions is that if p at some step of the
f j .׳־ fprocess once enters either a ־(+־ ( [+-] or - + ׳־[ -+] expectation state, under
continual disagreement, he will remain in that state from that time on.
That p has assigned specific performance expectations at some stage of 
the process affects not only his expectation state from that time on; there 
is also the fact that now there is some basis for the assignment of unit 
evaluations where before there was not. Given that p has already assigned 
states of C to self and other, we can assume that this assignment will in turn 
affect how p assigns unit evaluations to persons in this self-other choice 
structure. For,
Assumption 3.6. At any stage of the process: if p has already assigned 
positively and negatively evaluated states of C to self 
and other, then he will tend to assign positive and negative 
unit evaluations to p 1 and o in balance with his assignment 
of states of C .
Several important implications of assumption 3.5 should be noted. First, 
once p has assigned states of C to self and other, his process of making final 
decisions is more likely to be structured in the order: who is right and then 
what is right than was true before he assigned states of C. Second, taken 
together with earlier assumptions, 3.6 implies that a p in a '+־j¿ [+•־] 
state will be more likely than a p in a + 0 0 ]  ,-־•׳] state to make P-responses 
whereas a p in a j-+ [־+] state will be more likely than a p in a , 0 0 ]  %+־] 
state to make O-responses. In general, we assume p will not make responses 
that are imbalanced with his expectation states; thus, assumption 3.6 is 
crucial to understanding how the process comes to be self-maintaining.
There is a plausible, more general formulation of assumption 3.6 
that would allow for a more rapid process of assignment than the one we 
have described. We have assumed that an individual in a j +~\ [00] state 
or a 00] +״] state, when faced with the dilemma of a disagreement, has - +
no person basis for deciding who is correct before he decides which alter­
native is correct. Given our present knowledge it would be equally plausible 
to assert that the general expectation states associated with the states of 
D are themselves sufficient to provide a basis for deciding who is correct 
and who incorrect. In that case, we might assume that unit evaluations of 
persons precede evaluations of alternatives, and that the self-other choice 
structure even at this early stage of the process will be &<i*npleted so as to 
balance with general expectation states. The effect of this in wuuia
be to make the '+- i [00] and ]+-{ [+־] states (or equivalently the ^־+.־
v
and y—I־; [—I־] s tates) iuoxc lioarX-y aliVe ■with respect to the lik elih o o d  of a 
P- or an 0״response than is the case in  tVwe tot^^av^»» •.» Uov« given in 
section C. The alternative form of assumption 3.6 would be as follows,
Assumption 3.6* At any stage of the process: if p has already assigned
positive and negative states either of general expectations 
o_ of C, then he will tend to assign positive and negative 
unit evaluations of persons in balance with his assignement 
of states of general expectations or C.
Thus if only general expectation states have been assigned by p to 
self and other, which is true at the initial stages of the process, these 
expectation states will already affect how p assigns unit evaluations
D. An alternative formulation of assumption 3.6.
to p' and o. Further if both general and specific states have been assigned 
there is no question as to the manner in which unit evaluations are to be 
assigned under assumption 3.6*. For by assumption 3.5 general and specific 
states can come to be assigned if and only if the general and specific 
expectation states are themselves in balance.
In what follows we will use assumption 3.6 but we will indicate, where 
appropriate, differences in specific predictions between assumption 3.6 and 
assumption 3.6*.
E. Assigning probabilities
The assumptions of Section C enable us to completely specify the 
possible sequences of events, for any p on the nth step of the assignment 
process, and the possible states that p might be in at the start of the 
nth + 1 step. To each possible event we now want to assign a probability.־*
For convenience we label expectation states in the following manner:
1 00] :■+■' ״] 
2 = s+־j 1+-]
3 = -+3 [00]
4 ־  ^-+V [-+]
From the assumptions we have made so far it is clear that there is 
a possibility of a P response, or alternatively of an 0-response, for a p
It should be remarked at this point that the manner in which the next set 
of assumptions are stated and even the fact that one can assign probabilities 
to events anticipates a mathematical model such as the one which is described 
Section IV.
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in every one of the four possible expectation states. We will use the 
letter s( ^  (where i = 1, 2, 3, 4, the index denoting the expectation state) 
to represent the probability of a P-response, and = 1־ to represent 
the probability of an O-response. The assigned probabilities, then, are:
Assumption 3.7. Whatever p's expectation states and responses on the first 
n-1 steps, if pis in the ith expectation state on the nth 
step of the process, then he will make a P-response with 
probability (s^ or an 0-response with probability O^׳ .
The are underived quantities in our theory and are determined 
experimentally. The most important feature of assumption 3.7 is that these 
probabilities do not depend on what step in the process we happen to be at 
Theydepend only on p's expectation state and therefore are assumed to be the 
same for every step of the process. There are two further underived quantities: 
For a p in state 1 on the nth step of the process, there is some probability 
that he will, if he makes a P-response, move to state 2 to begin the nth + 1 
step; correspondingly, for p in state 3 there is some probability that if he 
makes an 0-response, he will move to state 4 to begin the nth + 1 step. Roman 
letters r and d denote these probabilities, respectively. Probabilities 
that states 1 or 3 are not changed, i.e., that p remains in those states, 
will then be r = 1 ־ r, and d = 1 - d.
Assumption 3.8. Whatever p's expectation states and responses on the first 
n-1 steps, if pis in expectation state 1 on the nth step of 
the process and makes a P-response, he will move to state
2 with probability r or remain in state 1 with probability 
? .
Assumption 3.9. Whatever p's expectation states and responses on the first 
n־l steps,if pis im expectation state 3 on the nth step of 
the process and makes an 0-response, he will move to state
4 with probability d or remain in state 3 with probability 
d.
The principal force of assumptions 3.8 and 3.9 is that the probabilities 
of transition from state to state depend only on p 's expectation state at the 
nth step, together with his response on that step. Thus, changes in expecta­
tions do not depend on the whole past history of the expectation process. 
Furthermore, assumptions 3.8 and 3.9 assert that the probabilities r and d 
are the same at every step of the process; they are not seen to change as 
the process itself advances.
Finally: in section C, where we have specified the set of action 
possibilities that can occur at any stage of the process, we sometimes 
assumed that only one possibility could occur. For example, although the 
response alternatives ordinarily allow both a P■■ and an O-response, when p's 
choice structure assigns a positive evaluation to p' and a negative evaluation 
to o, and O-response is not possible. Furthermore, once p is in expectation 
state 2 or 4 we no longer permit any possibility of changing expectation state. 
In such cases we may speak of a unique alternative at a given stage of the 
process, and,
Assumption 3.10. At any stage of the process: given a unique alternative for
p, that alternative occurs with probability 1.
To illustrate how the assumptions about the action space, together 
with the assumptions about assigning probabilities, completely define the
process of assignment, Figure 5 shows the structure of the nth step of the 
process starting from any expectation state. For example, Figure 5a shows 
a step in the assignment process for an actor starting in state 1. Dis­
agreement, experimentally controlled, occurs with probability 1. The 
disagreement is resolved with a P-response with probability ׳X!• If 
a P-response occurs, p changes his expectation state to state 2 with 
probability r. If p changes his expectation state, the nth+1 step of 
the process begins with p in state 2 (Figure 5b), from which state he may 
make a P-response with probability or an O-response with probability 
H  OJ but from which in either case he does not change expectations. Figures 
5c and 5d may be read in the same straightforward manner.
Figure 5. P's action space on the nth and n+1 step
of the process, given p in any of the four 
expectation states on the nth step.
Unit Expectation
Evaluation States at start 












Figure 5a. P starts step in state 1.
Expectation State Experimentally Observed Unit Expectation
at start of nth Controlled Response Evaluation State at start
step. Disagreement of p' and o of n+1 step.
( (+־ ־+‘■ j [+־]0
D]+־[ +־
]+־[ +־p ----- (+ _)
Figure 5b. P starts in state 2. In view of assumption 3.6 
we might reverse the order in which the observed 
response and unit evaluations occur; since, how­
ever, they are in 1:1 correspondence it makes no 
difference in which order they occur in the figure.
]־+[ <•־+׳ -
> )־+(0
W  {00 j
D
+ '  [00](+-)p
Figure 5c. P starts in state 3.
0 ----  ( -+)
D;-+» [-+]
]־+[ ׳ +)+־(P ■־
Figure 5d. P starts in state 4. Again the order in which unit 
evaluations and observed response occurs might be 
reversed without altering the outcome.
IV. Formalization of the Allocation Process .
In formalizing our theory we take as the basic units of analysis
the four types of expectation patterns p can hold, and the two types of
resolution behavior in which he can engage, i.e., making a P response or
making an 0-response.
As the n-step process proceeds, the subject makes a sequence of P-
or O~responses and moves through the basic expectation states 00] ,' ׳+־], 
r 7 c 7 1*, +־v [+־] , j ]־ ~+ ■* [,00] ־+< +]. We assume that movement through the 
expectation states can be described by means of a Markov chain whose 
states are the four expectation patterns. To specify this chain wo must 
specify the transition probabilities that is, the probability that
the subject moves to state j on the nth + 1 step of the process given 
that he is in state i on the nth step. We compute these probabilities 
by making use of the assumptions of Section III, which determine the pos­
sibilities and probabilities of p's action space. The structure of this 
action space has been represented in Figure 5. From the tree diagrams in 
Figure 5, we can determine the transition matrix P, for the expectation 
process. We shall refer to this Markov chain as the expectation process.
Matrix of One-step Transition Probabilities for the Expectation Process
nth + 1 step
y+-\ [00] f+־ ¿ [+-] f-+-; [00] f-+l [-+]
C+ 0 0 ]  } ־] 
i [+-]P
■+'; [00]

















During the course of p's decision-making process this expectation 
process is not observed. The expectation states have the function of 
theoretical constructs in our model.^ In general terms what is being 
assumed in this, and other expectation models, is the following pattern 
of events. At all times p is in an expectation state, and given a 
situational event--such as a disagreement with o-־tais response to that 
event is determined by the expectation state he is in. Thus, his expectations 
will affect the way he responds to his environment. But there is another 
crucial facet to this relation between p and his environment; namely, the 
effect of his response on the expectation state he is in. In general, 
p's response may (1) have no effect on his expectation ctatp— as in the 
case where he moves from a +־j, [00] state to a [00] state; or ('¿‘) it
may ,,disconfirm" his expectation state--as when he makes a P--response
and pressures are generated on p which may result in change of state, for
/׳־• ’* C 7example, moving from a +- [00] to a +•־ _, [+-] state; or (3) it may
"confirm" his existing expectation states-־as when he makes a P־response 
r > : ־ ׳  and moves from a-y+־ < [+-] to a /+־I [+-] state. Thus in terms of our 
model, p's behavior is described as a probabilistic function of his 
expectation state--given a situational event; and p!s expectation state 
is in turn a probabilistic function of his behavior--given a particular 
response to his environment.
At the initial step of the process, we know p's general expectation
JCf. Berger, Cohen, Snell, and Zelditch, 1962.
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state and assume that he has not assigned states of C to himself and o; 
hence p by assumption is either in i + 0 0 ]  ־] or *f—K* [00]. For the 
remainder of the process, p's expectation state is unknown and unobservable, 
so that we are interested in reasoning from his observable response 
process to his expectation process and, in turn, from the expectation 
process to his response process. We now turn our attention to this 
problem.
The transition matrix P can be partitioned into four submatrices;
y'
a matrix P., describing the expectation process for the states {+■• ; [00]i- í* J״־
and [+־] ; a matrix ?2 , for the process involving the states > 00] ;+״]
and 5 ]•־ ־+' +]; and two zero matrices M and N which, respectively, describe 
the process from states 1 and 2 to 3 and 4, and 3 and 4 to 1 and 2. As a 
consequence of our assumptions, P^ and P^ may be used independently in 
describing the behavior of p; whether P^ ■or applicable depends upon
p's initial state of D, which is always known. M and N are not relevant 
to our problem of describing p's behavior.
For convenience, P^ is presented below. All observations to be 
made about P^ can be translated to comparable observations about P?.
P^ represents the one-step transition probabilities of a two-state Markov 
chain for the expectation process for a p who enters S with the positi­
vely evaluated state of the diffuse status characteristic. In using P^
(or P0), we assume that the response of the subject depends only on the 
expectation state he holds on the nth step and not, for example, on his 
vc'SVa «e on the nth - 1 step. The effect of his responses on the nth 1 ־
step is already represented in our model by the expectation state he 
has moved to on the nth step, given his prior response.
Matrix of One-step Transition Probabilities for Expectation Process involving;
< /׳־
States •:+״ i■ f001 and f+~|
nth 4- 1 step
{ + 1 ־ [oo] [+-]
/ ( l - y )  O^r
V 0
Table 2
In fact, P^ is an absorbing Markov chain, representing the fact that, 
under continual disagreement, we expect p to eventually end up in an 
expectation state compatible with the interaction process, and, once 
there, to remain. While our model predicts that p will bo absorbed into 
an expectation state, it does not predict that p will absorb into a P 
or 0-response. It predicts that once p is in the absorbing expectation 
state [+־*]> be will make ?״responses with probability^^ an<^  O-responses
with probability^ . This can be easily seen by reviewing the tree diagram 
of p's action space for these states shown in Figures 5a and 5b, Section III.
To fully describe p's behavior in S s given that we always know his 
initial expectation state, we must therefore estimate the values of three 






of this type of Markov chain to derive theoretical quantities describing 
various aspects of p's behavior in S. Given empirical estimates for 
these quantities, empirical estimates for our parameters*^, r, a n d ^  
can then be obtained. With these, the behavior of p can be probabilistically 
described in S . To test our model, still other theoretical quantities, 
logically independent of those used in estimating¡^ ^ , r, and 0^ > are 
derived from our stochastic model. These are then compared with our 
predicted quantities, given estimates for , r, and
To illustrate the nature of one of these quantities which can be 
derived from our model, we shall consider a quantity which gives us the 
predicted sequence through time of P-responses, the "P-response curve.1 
To obtain the P-response curve, for a subject starting out in a given 
expectation state, we need the mean number of P-responses on the nth
trial given that p is initially in state i.
8It can be shown that for our model the mean number of P-responses 
on the nth trial if the process starts in state 1 is
(1) M^ [# of P-responses on nth trial] = + ( ^־ i " r n^
while the mean number of P-responses on the nth trial if the process 
starts in state 3 is
־
For additional discussion of estimating and testing quantities, 
see Appendix.
g3ee Appendix for the derivation of these two quantities.
(2) [# of P־responses on the nth trial] =<tt ^  7 - >;/) (l- cx^d)11
From expressions (1) and (2) families of curves can be generated 
which describe the behavior of p, through time, given an initial state 
of the characteristic D. It should be observed that each expression is 
the sum of two components, and that the components on the right tend to 
zero as n increases. This represents one of the important consequences 
of our theory and model; namely that under the fixed conditions of
curves for the observable responses of p, given that he is initially a
s + 0 0 ]  ־] or T— \ [00] expectation s t a t e . These curves ax«3 given in
■f ^
Figure 5.







In general, these theoretically predicted response curves will
depend only upon p's initial state and the values of the parameters in
our specific interaction situation.
We can note with respect to the above examples that different
•kresponse curves would have been obtained if assumption 3.6 held rather 
than 3.6 (assuming, of course, that all remaining assumptions hold). 
Assumption 3.6* would have lead us to predict thatfc^  ^  J■ and that the 
response curves for the starting states under the two different 
assumptions would differ as follows:
(1) the response curve for a p initially in a *]+-■ [00] state would 
begin at a larger value/
(2) the response curve for a p initially in a >-+J [00] state would 
begin at a smaller value
(3) both curves would be flattened because the asymptotic value of 
each curve will not much differ from the initial value.
These changes are illustrated in Figure 7 where for each starting state 
the solid lines are the response curves given previously (see Figure 6) 
and the dotted lines are possible response curves under assumption 3.6* 









It is important to observe that we can empirically distinguish between 
the two assumptions as a consequence of our having extended the theory 
in a formal manner to a specific action process. Without this formalization 
it would have been difficult to have made precise enough predictions to 
have decided between the two assertions. Whether assumption 3.6* holds 
rather than assumption 3.6 is an open question which can now be decided 
by empirical test.
V . Summary
Our starting point has been experiments of Strodtbeck, Torrance, 
Hurwitz, Zander, and Hymovich, and others, in which actors faced with a 
valued, collective task, who differ with respect to characteristics like 
sex, color, occupation, etc., are observed to differ also with respect 
to power and prestige in the group, in such a way that the status 
differences correlate with the power-prestige differences. We reason
that: (1) Because actors care about the outaome, they are trying to 
discover any cue that will indicate to them who will have the best 
solutions; (2) such cues, in the absence of any other basis will be 
provided by any characteristic that has the following three properties-- 
it is differentially evaluated, associated with specific performance 
characteristics, and associated with general, or global, expectations of 
inferiority and superiority; (3) though initially, whatever the characteristic 
that is relevant to the task-outcomes, actors have not attributed specific 
performance expectations to each other in the situation, they will come 
to see the status-characteristic as relevant and use it as a basis for 
assigning expectations about performance of the task at hand; unless, of 
course, they have specific prior knowledge that the status characteristic 
is not relevant; (4) if the status-characteristic is seen as a basis for 
assigning specific performance epxectations, we expect the assignment 
to occur in only one way: namely, so that the general and specific 
expectations are balanced; (5) finally, the observed power-prestige order 
can be viewed as a function of the underlying expectation states, 
so that if these are balanced with the status-characteristic, the power- 
prestige order will be found to correlate with it.
We have extended this theory to a dynamic model of a specific action 
process through which allocation can take place. We are given as further 
conditions that p and o are in an n-step, multi-stage, non-veridical, 
decision-making situation at each step of which they are required to make 
a binary choice, exchange information about their choice, are experimentally
־46־
manipulated so as to discover that they disagree, and then must make a 
final decision. On resolving this disagreement they will come to believe 
one actor right, the other wrong; and there will be some pressure to 
generalize these unit-step evaluations to ascertain the relative abilities 
of the two actors at the task. This will occur only if such assignment 
is balanced with the general expectation state. Once assigned, the 
specific performance expectations then come to determine the action 
process. The process of change in the underlying expectation states we 
have formulated as a Markov chain of which the observed response process 
is a probabilistic function.
The relation of the two parts, Section II and Section III, merits 
some further comment. As was noted in the introduction the specific 
action process we have formulated is only one of several that might be 
imagined: for example, still using the expectation action situation 
referred to in Section II (see footnote 1), one might have looked at an 
actor p who, in making a decision, had the right to ask help of two 
other actors, o^ and who differed with respect to a diffuse status 
characteristic. The observed response process would then have been a 
request for help from one or the other actor, while the underlying 
process would still be one in which p attributed expectations to the 
other two. Hence the theory of Section II does not compel us to look 
on the formulation in Section III as the one and only dynamic model 
consistent with it; indeed if this were not the case one could raise 
serious questions as to the usefulness of the theory.
APPENDIX
Estimation of Parameters and Testing of the Model*
I. Estimation of Parameters
We will begin estimation of the parameters of the model with 
estimation of ^  ^  and Since the estimation of both quantities is
essentially identical in procedure, we will treat in detail only the 
estimation of Q( ^ •
The estimation of is based on the fact that if p begins the 
process in state 1, he cannot change state until he makes a P-response. 
This means that the length of an initial run of 0-responses is a function 
only of  ^ and not of change־of-state parameters. Hence, it suffices to 
obtain an expression for the expected value of the length of an initial 
run of O-responses in order to estimate & ׳
The probability that the length of an initial run of O־responses 
is n trials can be found by observing that:
the probability that the length is 0 trials is ^ ^ , 
the probability that the length is 1 trial is  ^*X ^  ,
2 ״the probability that the length is 2 trials is
and so on
It can thus be shown that the probability that the length is n trials 
is given by
•
* The results of this section are based on work done by one of the 
authors and J. Laurie Snell, Department of Mathematics, Dartmouth College,
•2־
The expected value of this probability mass function is given by
C*.*
/  nJ< 1 1 *׳־ , 
n=0
which is a familiar form whose sum is given by
‘ <1 !
— ------- - =— 2
(i-
which can be simplified to
■
This means that if k is the observed mean value of the length of initial
O-response runs, then C\ can be easily estimated by setting 'V'1/C^ equal 
to k. When this is done,
='1 1 + k
The estimation of <x3 is along similar lines,with the difference that 
the length of initial runs of P-responses is the quantity of interest. 
Hence, if c is the observed mean value of the length of initial P-response 
runs for a p who begins in state 3, then
c
^ 3 = —  *
The estimation of 0( ״ and , is somewhat more difficult. Since,2 '4
as in the previous case, the estimation procedure for each parameter is
-3-
essentially identical, we will deal in detail only with ־>, ^ .
Recall from Section IV that our model of the expectation process is 
an absorbing Markov chain with a single absorbing state. To estimate  ^
we need only observe that once the process has reached absorption it 
becomes an independence trials process and the best estimate of \  ^  is 
simply the mean proportion of responses which are P-responses while the 
process is in absorption. Hence the problem of estimating reduces
to the problem of obtaining an estimate of how many steps it takes for 
the process to reach absorption. Such an estimate can be obtained by 
using the value of 0* ^  and various hypothetical values of r in carrying out 
simulation runs on a high-speed computer.
The final two parameters to be estimated are r and d. Again, we 
will describe only the estimation of r> since d is estimated in an 
essentially identical fashion. The simplest expression which is sufficient 
for the estimation of r is the expression for the expected value of the 
number of P-responses in N trials. Such an expression is obtained as 
p
follows. Let U (n * 0,1, ..., N1) be a counting function which takes 
on the following values: 
p = 1 if response on trial n is a P-response
p = 0 if response on trial n is an 0-response
P P P P pIf S^ - Uq + + ... + ^, then the expected value of S^ given that
pthe process starts in state 1, E, the expression desired.
־4"
E1 (SN} = E (Uo + U1 + *•* + U N-1}
« E (U^) + E (U*) + E (U^_1)
pThe expected value of can be found by noting that
E1 <U ־ ״<  P1 ‘Un ״ ־  
and that
P (U¡1 = ־) = P(U^ = 1/Z = 1) P a  = 1) + P(u^ = 1/Z = 2) P (Z « 2) i n  n n  I n  n n  J i n
where Z^ is a random variable which takes on the value 1 if the expectation 
state on trial n is state 1 and the value 2 if the expectation state is 
state 2.
It can be clearly seen from Figure 5, that
P(U¡־ = l/Z = 1) = and P ( U ¡ 1  = ־/Z = 2) = ׳ \ • n n I n n  I
The expressions for P, (Z = 1) and P, (Z = 2) are obtained from the one-1 n I n
step transition matrix of the Markov chain which is labeled P^;
1 / 1 - ■>n r \
f !
/
It can be shown that the probability that the process is in any particular
state at trial n is given by a vector rj^  which is equal to tj-qP^ where
17 is the initial vector of the chain.^ In this case, 7T =(10).' o o
“For a more detailed treatment of Markov chains, see Kemeny and Snell(I960)
'3־'
Raising to the nth power gives





PL(Zn - 1) « ( 1 - ^ r ) ׳
P1(Zp = 2) = 1-(!״ ròvlr)!
hence that
[1“ ** lr>n)־1] 2*C ־*־ Pl (Un = 1} = !VM  ( 1 " ^  lr>n
Therefore,
N-l




H « i 2 + (•Vj- otj) V  (1- v > '
n=0
for large N
P ' * 2  ' ~ 1 ^  ) ׳ ^
E l < 4 >  ־ [ , t X 2 +   •
We next observe that had the process begun in the absorbed state that
V s»> = ׳" n 2 .
P P PTaking the difference E^(S^) - = A  we obtain
p ( ,A 1- <\2)
Using the previously obtained estimates of and  ^ and the observed
pvalues of ,we obtain an estimate of r.
II. Testing the Model
There are a great many empirical quantities which can be used to 
test the model, given that we have^timates for the parameters. A quantity 
of particular interest is the expected value for the number of alternations 
in N trials. An alternation is defined for any two adjacent responses as 
the occurrence of either a P״response on the first and an 0-response on the 
second or vice versa. We will define a counting function for alternations as 
follows:
AU = 1 if the response on trial n is a P-response and the n
response on trial n+1 is an O-response or vice versa.
= 0 otherwise.
Then,
P (U^ = 1) = P(l/ = 1/Z = 1) P.(Z = 1) + P(U^ = 1/Z = 2) P (Z = 2) i n  n n  i n  n n  i n
From Figure 5 of Section III we obtain
P(u£ = 1/Zn = 1) ־^־  -X x + f^ 1(r 0<2 + r X!)
P(UA = 1/Z = 2) = 2 ׳-'>״ . n n i i
Therefore,
Pl(Un = 1} = (1 ־’ ־ * l r)n <׳>il r”׳l + *A i ~<!r +  c\ !r ’^ 2 ) + 2Cl־( l ־V ) nl ^  2*
The above expression is itself useful and can be used to generate a response 
curve for alternations, i.e., the probability that an alternation occurs on 
the nth step of the process, which can be compared to the observed proportion 
of alternations at each step of the process. However, we are primarily in­
terested in the expected value for the total number of alternations in N trials 
Hence, let 
N-2
S״ - r  I* ■
Then
־8־




l-d- «x1r)N 1 ־ j
JV= 2(N1־) v ־ 2־\ vV2 + (f\1 1 + ‘X 1 ׳ 2־ 2׳^ x 2 A  2)
which is the desired expression.
For large N we have
A  ~  -  ( " • ! S  +  * , ״ ־ > ,  +  < V  * 2  2  ־  'A 2  V >El(S¿) - 2(» -1) 0<2 + - i - i - 1 1   
Substituting estimated values for the parameters in the above expression 
gives a predicted value for the mean number of alternations over N trials.
Other quantities which can be used to test the model will not be derived 
formally. Rather they are listed below with the appropriate mathematical 
expressions.
(i) Assuming p starts in state 1, the mean number of times that the 
responses on trial n and n + 1 are both P״responses is given by
vN-1 "11-(1-
* V
( N 2 ^ ( 1 ־  +  t ' V  +  %  i H 2 r  2 > °  ־ ]
(ii) Assuming p starts in state 1, the mean number of times that the 
responses on trial n and n + 1 are both 0 responses is given by
־־, vN-1 "~1-(1- <\ 1r)1
(V ru
״9-
(iii) The mean number of initial P-response runs for p starting in 
state 1 is given by
* 1  * 2  + * !  * 2 r •
׳v2(l•■ fi^ r)
It is generally true that these quantities are logically independent of 
each other and of alternations. An exception, however, is that the expression 
for alternations determines the sum of (i) and (ii).
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